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INTRODUCTION: TAKING THE STAND
BARBARA ALLEN BABcOCK*
The style of a criminal case baldly describes an unequal contest,
pitting the State, or the United States, or more pungently yet, the
People, against John Doe.1 But with our deep cultural distaste for
mismatches, we seek to balance the odds at trial by shoring up the
accused, giving him independence and autonomy, rights and op-
tions. Most important is the accused's choice between remaining
* Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. The author thanks Wil-
liam Simon and Robert Weisberg for helpful comments on an earlier draft, Michael Fitzpat-
rick (J.D., Stanford, 1993) for sharpening my interest in Dunnigan with an excellent paper,
and Thomas Grey, first among colleagues, for softening the pitch.
1. The situation of the criminally accused overmatched in an adversary contest by a state
with far greater resources and procedural advantages is the theme of the now classic article
by Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused. Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YAE L.J. 1149 (1960). For a modem update showing that little has changed
in this regard, see Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393
(1992). In what will undoubtedly be a widely used exchange, William H. Simon, The Ethics
of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703 (1993), argues that the inbalance of resources
has been exaggerated, and at any rate does not justify in most cases, aggressive defense
tactics to ease its impact. In response, David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91
MICH. L. Rv. 1729 (1993), points to dozens of studies and cases showing that the imbalance
exists, and argues that trying to equalize the adversaries is a legitimate defense goal.
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silent and testifying in his own behalf. Uniquely in our system, the
accused may sit mute while the government strives to meet its
handicapped burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Or the
defendant may choose to tell his side or explain himself, by testify-
ing in his own behalf. Thus we try to equalize the adversaries: sen-
tient individual against sovereign state.2
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right
to silence, but the right to speak was not explicit until 1987 when
the Burger-Rehnquist Court inferred it from the purposes of due
process, from the right to summon witnesses and from the implica-
tions of the Fifth Amendment itself.3 This latecomer from the due
process pantheon trails no clouds of glory, though; it was not born
of a grand purpose to balance the adversary contest by bolstering
the accused. That distinctive goal of American criminal procedure
is fading as a background fact for deciding whether a defendant
received fair treatment.
In this introductory Essay, I want to illustrate what has hap-
pened through a little case from the Court's last term, United
States v. Dunnigan.4 I use the term "little" because neither the
accusation nor the accused were in any sense notorious, and be-
cause the Court itself treated the case summarily in a short unani-
mous opinion. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall were not
there to dissent, and no one else was able, or perhaps inclined, to
acknowledge a defense perspective. My larger purpose, as always
2. "The state and [the individual] meet m adversary trial, as equals-strength
against strength, resource against resource, argument against argument." Abe Fortas, The
Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B. Ass'N J. 91, 98-99 (1954).
See Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1136-42 (1982) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment
is critical to our view of the adversary system in criminal cases); see also David Dolinko, Is
There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1063
(1986) (setting out arguments about the Fifth Amendment privilege, and finding the ratio-
nales inadequate). A major modern proponent of the "equalizing" functions of the Fifth
Amendment is R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. Rav. 15 (1981).
3. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987). In holding that the defendant could
not be prevented from testifying by a state statute barring hypnotically-refreshed testi-
mony, the Court traced the evolution of the defendant's right to testify in his own behalf.
Id., see also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) (holding that presentation of the
defendant's unsworn statement would not substitute for his right to testify).
4. 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993).
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when I write about, or teach, criminal procedure, is to explain the
criminal defense world view, and-perhaps this is quixotic-even
to arouse a sympathetic understanding in some readers to whom it,
is an unnatural way to look at things.5
Sharon Dunnigan took the stand and denied her guilt of a one
count indictment for conspiracy to sell cocaine.6 A jury disbelieved
her and, at the urging of the prosecutor, the trial judge increased
her sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") because he found that she had committed perjury.7
Reversing, the Fourth Circuit held that the probability of sentence
enhancement interfered with the accused's constitutional choice
between silence and speech.8 The Supreme Court reinstated the
sentence, observing that "a defendant's right to testify does not
include a right to commit perjury.""
The government presented five witnesses who swore that Dunim-
gan went from Charleston, West Virginia to Cleveland, Ohio, to
5. For previous efforts along these lines, see Barbara A. Babcock, Gary Gilmore's Law-
yers, 32 STAN. L. REV. 865 (1988); Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 175 (1983-84); Babcock, Fair Play, supra note 2.
6. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1114.
7. Id. at 1114-15. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were developed by an expert bi-
partisan commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)
(1988). The Guidelines under the Act, whose constitutionality was upheld against a chal-
lenge that it violated separation of powers, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989), essentially make the Commission's determination of sentences binding on the courts.
Dunmgan's sentence was enhanced pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which states in full:
If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1989). The commentary to this Guideline makes clear, and the Court in
Dunntgan approved it, that trial perjury is an instance of obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G.§ 3C1.1 cmt. l(c) (Nov. 1989); Dunntgan, 113 S. Ct. at 1115-16.
8. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 185 (4th Cir. 1991) ("The rigidity of the
guidelines makes the § 3C1.1 enhancement an intolerable burden upon the defendant's
right to testify in his own behalf.").
Other circuit courts that had considered the perjury-enhancement issue had upheld the
Guideline. See, e.g., United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 1991); United,
States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1535 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Acosta-Cazares,
878 F.2d 945, 953 (6th Cir. 1989). But some circuits had required additional specific findings
of perjury before the judge would enhance a sentence, though finding that the judge need be
satisfied of them only by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Con-
treras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wallace, 904 F.2d 603, 604 (11th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 989 (10th Cir. 1990).
9. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1117.
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purchase cocaine, and several added that she sold cocaine from her
apartment. 10 Against these numbers, Dunnigan's protested inno-
cence, coupled with a story about being in Cleveland to visit rela-
tives,11 made the trial court smell mendacity Yet, all of the gov-
ernment witnesses were themselves part of the demi-monde of
cocaine dealing and addiction. 2 Originally, all five had been
charged in the same conspiracy with Dunnigan, and were presuma-
bly testifying in hope of favorable treatment for themselves. 3 As-
suming skillful cross-examination by the defense, the odds may not
have looked so formidable at the moment she decided to take the
stand. 4
More to the point from a defense world view, Sharon Dunnigan's
words may have been less a disavowal of the charges than a plea
for mercy- her formal denial, a speech-act to establish her charac-
ter, her personhood, her place in the world (which was at worst, a
10. Id. at 1114.
11. Id.
12. Aside from the ringleader's testimony, the only person who testified directly to trips
to Cleveland with Dunnigan to purchase drugs was a paranoid schizophrenic and a heroin
addict. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth Circuit
found error in the failure to reveal this to the defense in advance, but that the error was
harmless. Id. at 182.
13. "Common sense would suggest that [an accomplice, co-conspirator or another facing
criminal charges] often has a greater interest in lying in favor of the prosecution rather than
against it, especially if he is still awaiting his own trial or sentencing." Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967); see also United States v. Garcia, 528 F.2d 580, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the defendant was entitled to a cautionary instruction on credibility when the
government's case was based solely on the testimony of an informer or accomplice).
14. "The facile logic of hindsight deems such disbelieved testimony a lie Hindsight,
however, does not help the accused when he must decide whether to take the stand. He
already knows that he faces the possibility of conviction, and that he is much less likely to
be acquitted if he remains silent " Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 183.
After Dunnigan testified, the government presented a sixth witness on rebuttal who swore
to a single, surveilled purchase from Dunnigan, after she had denied it on cross-examina-
tion. Id. at 181. This witness was vulnerable to impeachment for bias like the others, having
turned informer as a result of an earlier arrest. Id. Apparently, the prosecutor had not found
his testimony strong enough to base a charge on it, even though the alleged conspiracy was
in the same time period as the sale. Because the trial judge made no specific findings as to
what constituted perjury in his opinion, Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1114-15, the record does
not reflect whether he relied on the rebuttal testimony.
The assumption of adequate cross-examination of the government witnesses may be un-
realistic, since this was a "crack case from the projects," i.e., a routine criminal matter, and
Dunnigan had court-appointed counsel. Telephone Interview with Brent Beveridge, Court-
Appointed Appellate Counsel for Dunnigan (Aug. 31, 1993).
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very low minion in the drug hierarchy of Charleston). In this view,
her testimony was not about going to Cleveland but about going to
prison. Disclosing herself to the jury, Dunnigan sought redemption
and forgiveness.
In years past, Dunnigan might have pled guilty and thrown her-
self on the court's mercy.15 But today, this scenario is less likely
because the federal judge is constrained by mandatory sentencing
guidelines. While a criminal defendant may still seek lenience
through plea bargaining, the prosecutorial fact finder exacts a
(usually heavy) price. Only the jury may forgive freely They sel-
dom do so, however, and usually they need to hear from the ac-
cused to determine whether she deserves mercy 16
It is almost impossible to see the defendant as a deserving per-
son unless he testifies, partly because the natural order of the trial
15. For many years before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, district court judges en-
joyed broad discretion to decide the length of a sentence within statutorily specified ranges
for particular crimes. US. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT ON THE SENTENCING GUIDEMINEs 9
(1991). The philosophy was one of fitting the punshment to the individual and the pos-
sibilities of her rehabilitation. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of indeterminate sentencing). In United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S.
41 (1978), the Court upheld a sentence increase for trial perjury under the pre-Guidelines
indeterminate sentencing scheme. Many of the circuits that upheld the Guideline increase,
see supra note 8, did so because they determined that Grayson was still controlling law
despite the Guidelines. Dunmgan's counsel spent most of his Supreme Court brief distin-
guishmg Grayson, mostly on the ground that the GuIdelines were a "wooden and reflex"
increase for perjury forbidden expressly by Grayson. Brief for Appellee at 21-26, United
States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (No. 91-1300). Grayson also justified considera-
tion of trial perjury by its adverse reflection on the likelihood of rehabilitation, Grayson, 438
U.S. at 53, a prime goal of the indeterminate sentencing regime, one that has been consider-
ably downgraded under the Guidelines.
Justice Stewart, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, was par-
ticularly devastating in pointing out that any consideration of trial perjury was really pun-
ishment for a separate unproved crime without due process. Id. at 56 n.3.
16. See, e.g., Grayson, 438 U.S. at 58 n.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("A defendant who does
not take the stand will probably fatally prejudice his chances of acquittal.") (quoting Note,
The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J.
204, 212 n.36 (1956)); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340 n.10 (1978) (recognizing that
the negative Inference a jury may draw from the accused's decision not to take the stand
"may be inevitable"); see also Douglas Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of
Guilt from Silence: Griffin v. Califorma After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REv. 841, 858
(1980) (arguing that a defendant's fear that a jury will infer guilt from a failure to take the
stand is justified). The Fourth Circuit in Dunnigan stated of the decision to take the stand:
"[The defendant] already knows that he faces the possibility of conviction and that he is
much less likely to be acquitted if he remains silent." Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 183.
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dehumanizes him. For hours, days, even months, the jury has
heard the government's witnesses-the victims and the profession-
als: experts and police.17 Again and again, they have seen the mov-
ing finger point to the sullen, or perhaps sad, but always silent,
accused. Then, finally, he takes the stand and is suddenly revealed:
with a family or not, educated thus, worked in these ways, and
ultimately, "in his own words," he tells what happened on the "day
in question.""" As a practical matter, the only real chance the de-
fendant has to speak to the jury is by taking the stand-and this
he may not do without denying his guilt.'
17. David Luban points out the psychological and process factors that strongly incline the
jurors to believe the government's witnesses, especially the police: "the jury enters the box
with an overwhelming predisposition" against the accused. They believe that "where there's
smoke, there's fire," have "sympathetic responses to the police for offering physical protec-
tion," and are subject- to common impulses toward "obedience to authority" and the desire
to believe in a just world, which does not encompass government chicanery. Luban, supra
note 1, at 1741. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses are legitimated through process-jurors
believe the case has been carefully screened, and even that it may be stronger than it ap-
pears because of suppression on legal technicalities. Id. at 1742. Finally, Luban points to the
paradox that the very political legitimacy that we desire and applaud in government creates
an "enormous initial credibility" for its own witnesses. Id. at 1743.
18. On direct examination of their own witnesses, both sides are allowed to ask prelimi-
nary questions that place a witness in his setting. While the trial judge has discretion about
the extent of this inquiry, its relevance to establish credibility is clear. See United States v.
Fowler, 465 F.2d 664, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing permissible purposes of cross-exami-
nation, including identifying the witness "with his community" so that "the jury may inter-
pret his testimony in the light reflected upon it by knowledge of his environment") (quoting
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1931)); see also DAvID COHEN, How To WIN
CRIMINAL CASEs By ESTABLISHING A REAsoNABLE DOUBT 710 (1980) (recommending that
counsel question the defendant about "his family, his children, his work, his army back-
ground, his education and his general background"); 2 PUBLIc DEFNDzR SERV. FOR THE Dis-
TRICr OF COLUMBIA, CRaMINAL PRAc. INsT., TRIAL MANUAL 31.22-31.23 (1990) (emphasizing
the importance of "positive information about [the accused's] background" to bolster the
accused's credibility in the eyes of the jury); HowARD H. SPIL.TmAN, DmEcT EXAMINATION OF
WrINEssEs 85 (1968) (recommending that counsel "introduce" a witness to the fact finder at
the beginmng of direct examination by asking several background questions).
19. The only other chance the defendant might have to speak to a jury is to seek to
represent herself. Although Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), established the consti-
tutional right to self-representation, inferred from the Sixth Amendment, it is a perilous
course for anyone, but especially for Sharon Dunnigan with little education and less experi-
ence in the courtroom. Dunnigan had no prior felony record and is poor and black. Tele-
phone Interview with Brent Beveridge, Court-Appointed Appellate Counsel for Dunngan
(Aug. 31, 1993).
Because of the potential disorder arising from self-representation, as well as a distaste for
making so obvious the unbalance between the prosecution and the defense, judges do not
accord the right freely. They almost never allow "hybrid" representation in which there is
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To recapitulate-the Supreme Court has held that the defend-
ant has a right to this moment of humanization, just as he has a
right to defend himself generally, to summon witnesses, to have
the assistance of counsel. But he is limited in the form of his testi-
mony to a denial of the charges, and if the judge disbelieves his
denial, he will serve more tune in prison. Why should there be such
a price for taking the stand unsuccessfully' Because, the Court
says, there is no "right to commit perjury "20 Instead of making the
choice free between silence and speech, the Court has trammelled
the newly proclaimed right, largely by means of this potent one-
liner. The rhetorical power of this slogan is matched only by its
eerie irrelevance to the real world of criminal defense. Yet, it has
been decisive in cases where the accused argued that he was pre-
vented from witnessing for himself.
The "no right to perjury" line appeared first in Hams v. New
York,2' when the Burger Court was still new. In a brief opinion
which the Chief Justice said would be "of interest mostly to mem-
bers of the bar, 2 2 the Court held that if the defendant took the
stand, the State could impeach him with statements taken in viola-
tion of the Miranda rule. To the argument that this would chill or
burden fundamental privileges, the Court uttered for the first time
its magisterial non sequitur, leading two well-known commentators
to observe:
Of course a defendant has no "right to commit perjury."
Neither does a defendant have the right to commit murder, and
yet the Government may not prove that crime by means of an
mutual respect, planning and accord between the defendant and his lawyer, with tasks ap-
portioned appropriately. For example, the defendant might give the opening statement, and
do some direct examination. The lawyer might make the legal motions and objections, and
cross-examine the witnesses. Even when allowing the right to self-representation, courts
usually appoint a "stand-by" counsel to advise the accused, and allow this attorney consid-
erable latitude to intervene in the trial. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (hold-
ing that stand-by counsel did not unduly interfere with the defendant's right to self-repre-
sentation though there were many heated exchanges between them).
20. United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111, 1117 (1993).
21. 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
22. John P MacKenzie, Court Eases Restraints on Confessions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,
1971, at Al (quoting Chief Justice Burger), cited in Alan M. Dershowitz & John H. Ely,
Harris v. New York." Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1198 (1971).
1993]
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illegally obtained statement. Nor, indeed, could it introduce
such a statement as part of its case in chief in a perjury
prosecution. 3
Not only logic, but candor was a victim in the Harris case, which
suffered from a badly-doctored quote and distortion of the record
as well.24
Perhaps some institutional embarrassment led the Court, in a
later case, to draw back from Harris when the prosecutor, not to
be thwarted by the defendant's silence at trial, used his illegally
obtained statements to impugn the only witness instead. In James
v. Illinois,25 the Court held that the accused must not be prevented
from putting on any defense at all by the "no right to perjury"
line. As the latest decision turning on the locution, Dunnigan ig-
nores its lineage altogether: Harris is not even cited.
The Dunnigan opinion concentrated on refuting the contention
that additional years for perjury would be automatic whenever the
defendant testified.26 Concluding that it was enough that the trial
judge made a specific finding of perjury,27 the Court added that the
23. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 22, at 1222. The passage in the text continues by ob-
serving that the question is whether an illegally obtained statement may be used "to prove
perjury m the context of a trial for a different crime [which] is not answered by denying
that there is a right that no one asserted." Id.
24. The most egregious example of misquotation was the omission in a quote from Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), central to the opinion, that changed its meaning. See
Harris, 401 U.S. at 224. The words omitted are relevant here:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to
meet the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all elements of the
case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce
by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available
for its case in chief.
Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.
The worst misrepresentation of the record was the assertion that there was no "claim that
the statements made to the police were coerced or involuntary," when, in fact, Harris had
made exactly that claim in all courts, including the briefs and oral argument in the Supreme
Court itself. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 22, at 1201 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 224).
25. 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
26. The Court passed quickly over the argument about burdening the right to testify
partly because Dunnigan did not urge it strongly. See United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct.
1111, 1117 (1993). As a tactical matter, the defense apparently decided in light of United
States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), to focus on the lack of due process in the automatic
increase for perjury without a hearing or any standard of proof.
27. Although the Court in Dunnigan required a specific finding of perjury, which it de-
fined as "false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide
1993] TAKING THE STAND
risk of an erroneous enhancement was, at any rate, "inherent in a
system which insists on the value of testimony under oath."2 In
the same vein, the Court observed: "The requirement of sworn tes-
timony, backed by punishment for perjury, is as much a protection
for the accused as it is a threat."29 A fearful symmetry this, in a
situation where symmetry has never before been the point.
It is, moreover, almost perverse to say that a potent threat actu-
ally protects the defendant against prosecution lies. Police perjury,
especially, is virtually never prosecuted, though anecdotal and em-
pirical evidence show that it is common, especially when the sub-
ject is observance of the defendant's constitutional rights.30 In
thirty years of observing the criminal justice system, I do not recall
a case m which police witnesses were prosecuted for trial perjury.
To the extent they exist at all, such prosecutions would be in high-
proffle cases, not following upon either convictions or acquittals in
the everyday rounds of the criminal courts. Formal prosecution of
trial perjury on either side is so rare that the usual excuse of lim-
ited prosecutorial resources cannot completely account for the
scarcity 31
false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory," Dunnigan,
113 S. Ct. at 1116, and though it added that it is "preferable" for the court "to address each
element of the alleged perjury m a separate and clear finding," id. at 1117, it nevertheless
upheld the summary conclusion in the case. Observers of the system believe that added
years for perjury will be all but automatic after Dunnigan. See, e.g., Richard Reuben, Sen-
tencing Enhancement Allowed for Perjury, S.F. DAmY J., Feb. 24, 1993, at 1, 7 (quoting
well-known defense lawyers); Aaron Epstein, Lengthened Sentences for Liars: Defendants
Giving False Testimony Should Be Punished, The Supreme Court Ruled Unanimously,
PHIL. INQUIRER, Feb. 24, 1993, at A2 (quoting Nancy Hollander, President of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers: "there'll be fewer defendants taking the stand
from now on ").
28. Dunntgan, 113 S. Ct. at 1118.
29. Id.
30. Police perjury has been extensively documented in the circumstance of avoiding the
effects of the exclusionary rule. For an impressive recent study, collecting the major sources,
see Myron W Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLo. L. REv. 75, 98 & passim (1992); see also
HowARD JAMEs, CRIsIs IN THE CouRTs 189 (1971) (discussing pat stories in search and
seizure cases); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027,
1038 (1974) (describing police perjury as routine).
31. In other contexts, the Court has recognized that the purpose of a trial is to sort truth
from untruth, and that, m a sense, "simple perjury was not so much an obstruction of jus-
tice as an expected part of its administration." Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1116 (distinguishing
In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945), and Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919), which held
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Rather, a mix of sporting attitude and philosophical rationaliza-
tion underlies the failure to prosecute for trial perjury The police
witnesses are valuable members of the prosecutor's team, and will
be needed for future events. Discipline for mistakes, often a result
of overzealousness rather than malice, must be private to avoid
hurting team morale. At any rate, it's a rough game, even a war in
some metaphoric schemes, and both sides should have considerable
leeway in making their plays.
As to the defense, hitting a man when he is down-piling on in
football-is poor sportsmanship. In sport and in criminal trials,
the convicted defendant is certainly down. He will likely be draw-
ing a long prison sentence, so there is no need to strike again with
a second prosecution. It is especially unsportsmanlike when the de-
fendant has testified to his innocence because, in a sense, the origi-
nal conviction is for perjury as well as for the underlying crime.3 2 If
the jury had believed him, or found him worthy of mercy, they
would have acquitted.
To even a mildly relativist philosopher, each trial, especially in
view of the esoteric rules of criminal procedure and evidence, has
its own "truth"-encapsulated, summarized, and concluded by the
jury verdict. Prosecution for perjury is virtually impossible in this
view because it would require re-creating the first case in order to
know its peculiar "verities." The idea of the trial as a one-time
event, defying accurate reconstruction, is not unfamiliar to a Court
in the contempt context that perjury was not an obstruction of justice); see also Bronston v.
United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) (reversing a perjury conviction that was based on
deliberately misleading, but not literally untrue, testimony, and noting that perjury laws
must be administered with great care so as not to "discourage witnesses from appearing or
testifying").
32. In the same sense that the conviction embraces a finding of perjury if the defendant
testified, the pre-Guidelines sentence also might have included false testimony as a negative
factor in the picture of the whole defendant to which the judge was responding. Although
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), upheld a sentence that took perjury into ac-
count explicitly (though not assigning a set number of years for the increase), it was far
from a universal practice among trial judges. As Justice Stewart pointed out in dissent:
"Indeed, without doubting the sincerity of trial judges one may doubt whether the single
incident of a defendant's trial testimony could ever alter the assessment of rehabilitative
prospects so drastically as to justify a perceptibly greater sentence." Id. at 56 n.3 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Because of its automatic and mandatory nature once there is a finding of
perjury by the trial judge, Guidelines sentencing is far more threatening to due process and
to the right to take the stand than the previous highly discretionary sentencing practices.
[Vol. 35:1
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which has reshaped federal habeas corpus in that image.33 Most
dramatically, in the same term as Dunrngan, the Court found that
evidence of factual innocence came too long after the main event
to call for a hearing before a convicted defendant went to his
death.34 In a system in which a trial cannot be tested by its refer-
ential power, but refers only to its own closed form, prosecutions
for perjury will always be uncommon. Thus they cannot serve ei-
ther to deter perjury or to protect the accused against government
lying.
The discussion to this point might sound like an argument for
the right to commit perjury. The reasoning would go like this: in
reality, the trial is an occasion for each side to tell its best story,
constrained solely by indisputable physical facts and by cross-ex-
amination; the truth emerges at the end of the trial in the form of
the jury verdict. Some sworn falsehoods may be an unfortunate by-
product of each side's right to make its case, just as, for example,
the destruction and loss of evidence can occur from strictly observ-
ing the Fourth Amendment."
When I first started teaching criminal procedure, more than a
decade ago, I would coax students to entertain such ideas, urging
that the right to defend might trump all others. "Think about the
stakes for the accused facing a government bent on depriving hun
of all liberty, and maybe even his life," I would say. "Doesn't he
have the right to make his best defense?" Implacably they would
33. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986). See generally Robert Weisberg, A Great
Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRiPL L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1990) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court has substantially eviscerated federal habeas corpus jurisdiction as an instrument of
constitutional law).
34. Herrara v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 870 (1993). Indeed, in its cynicism about the possi-
bility of reopening a trial to ensure justice, the new judicial attack on habeas corpus irom-
cally echoes the advent of deconstructionist and post-structuralist scholarship in legal aca-
demics. Thus, all discourse is a "constructed" and fragile text; no text can rely on a point or
origin outside its own discourse. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the
Discourse of the Human Sciences, in THE STRucrURALisT CoNTRovERsY (R. Macksey & E.
Donato eds., 1972); see generally TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY (1983).
35. The paragraph in the text summarizes a subset of the larger ongoing discourse about
the contingent nature of truth in the adversary process, which usually is cast in terms of the
lawyer's professional responsibilities, i.e., whether these include assisting what the attorney
believes to be false testimony. Among much good writing, for the classic formulations on the
subject, see MONROE H. FREmEDbiA, LAwYERs' ETics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 43-58 (1975);
DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTcE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 197-201 (1988).
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
respond: "He doesn't have a right to lie. There is no constitutional
right to commit perjury" From these exchanges, I learned that the
slogan's expressive power depends on a common image held by
those who rely on it. A cool and calculating defendant, caught red-
handed, blandly denies the charges under oath. Counting on his
slick story and maybe his slick lawyer, he swaggeringly defies the
society he has already violated by committing some unspeakable
crime.
I have quite a different mental picture of the accused on the
stand. It is an amalgam of many of the people I represented, typi-
cally young African American men, uniformly frightened and pro-
foundly aware that their first public speaking was to occur before a
largely hostile audience. The performance aspects of witness-
ing-unlike natural story-telling, so intimate beneath its formal
structure-are difficult for all the non-professional actors, but they
are most demanding for the testifying accused. When the defend-
ant takes the stand, even in a routine case, the courtroom grows
unnaturally still and all thought converges for a moment. The only
other time this happens to the same degree is when the jury re-
turns its verdict. The two instants of extreme drama are connected
because few defendants who fail to testify win their cases.3 6
It is hard for a jury to acquit and they seldom do so. Felony
conviction rates after trial are around eighty percent, and in the
high ninety percent range for all charged felonies.37 It is especially
difficult to acquit in routine cases of street crime-the criminal
cases that most concern us. Subtle, and not so subtle pressures,
bear the jury toward conviction. The crime is serious, and if they
are wrong in acquitting, there will be more victims. The price of a
36. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Of course, in certain cases it is less impera-
tive that the defendant take the stand. See infra note 51 (discussing cases involving de-
fenses like entrapment and insanity, where the accused may rely solely on other witnesses to
present the defense effectively to the jury).
37. In Are Criminal Defenders Different?, supra note 1, David Luban prints as an epi-
graph: "Rate of felony acquittal in state courts: 1%. Rate of acquittal in U.S. District
Courts: 2.8%." Id. at 1729 (footnote omitted). One study cited by Luban shows that seven
out of nine cases (78%) tried in state felony courts result in conviction. Id. at 1741 n.55
(citing BARBARA BOLAND ET AL., US. DFP'T OF JUsTIcE, THn PROSECuION OF FELONY ARRESTS
1988, at 1 fig.2 (1992)). A second Department of Justice study showed a conviction rate of
five out of six cases (83%). Id. (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DFPnT OF JUSTIc,
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1988, at 12 tbl.13 (1990)).
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wrong conviction does not appear comparably high to the jury be-
cause from all they can see and surmise, the defendant probably
did something like what he is accused of doing here, or will do
something like it. Juries know, too, that evidence may be hidden
from them because ,of legal technicalities, and that this trial is a
costly procedure.3 8
It is even harder to acquit if the accused himself does not speak.
Then he becomes a mere referent-choose your own metaphor-a
piece of meat the dogs fight over, the trophy awarded the winning
gladiator. To many jurors, whether of color or white, rich or poor,
male or female, straight or gay, wise or ignorant, the passive de-
fendant deserves what he gets. Jurors believe that an innocent per-
son proclaims it from the rooftops.3 9
The assumption that juries would hold the accused's silence
against him was one reason for the common law rule that prohib-
ited the criminal defendant from testifying. If, as John Henry Wig-
more put it, "he failed to testify, that would damage his cause
more seriously than if he were able to claim that his silence were
enforced by law."40 Along with statutes and rules that now allow
the defendant to speak,41 constitutional doctrines and practices
evolved to protect the right to silence. Prosecutors may not argue,
for instance, that the defendant did not testify because he has
nothing to say, or indeed, comment at all upon the great gap in the
38. David Luban, in arguing that the overwbelming balance of advantage toward the
State in criminal cases justifies aggressive defense tactics, writes:
One of the first points that any criinmal defense lawyer will make about her
practice is that the legal burden of proof has nothing whatever to do with the
actual burden of proof: the jury enters the box with an overwhelming predispo-
sition to believe that the accused is guilty as charged.
Luban, supra note 1, at 1741.
39. Apparently, the Court believes it too because it has held that a defendant's pre-arrest
silence about his self-defense claim can be used to impeach his testimony at trial. See Jen-
kins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
40. 2 JOHN H. WIGMoRE, EVmENCE § 579, at 828 (James H. Chadboum rev., 1979); see
also Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (discussing the history of the disability of the
accused as a witness); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 578 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the 19th century reform allowing the accused to testify "often
has the effect of coercing a defendant into abandoning his privilege").
41. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1988) (etablishing the right of the accused to testify in
state courts); see also Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 596 (listing the dates on which states enacted
statutes allowing the defendant to testify).
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defense's case.42 And judges, on the defendant's request, or even
against his wishes, must instruct the jury that they should draw no
adverse inferences from the failure to speak.'3
Jurors often penetrate the safeguards we have erected around
the right to silence with this certain knowledge: if they themselves
were wrongly accused, they would say so. Several recent notorious
instances illustrate the importance of the defendant's testimony.
In the so-called Rodney King cases where police officers were tried
for using excessive force, the victim was actually the defendant in
the sense that the issue was whether he "deserved" what he un-
questionably got. At the state trial, King did not take the stand to
say he was the submissive victim of brutality; in the federal trial
he did and convictions followed. For another contemporary illus-
tration, William Kennedy Smith could never have been acquitted
of rape without his beautifully groomed account of the circum-
stances under which he had intercourse with "the alleged victim."
Why would a defendant, then, ever pass up his main chance;
that is, why would he elect not to take the stand? One reason is
that he has no defense, though a sensible system would make a
guilty plea desirable for such a person. Another reason is that he
cannot articulate his defense himself from the stand. Perhaps he
has a criminal record, or confessed when arrested and these facts
would emerge on cross-examination, or maybe he is unattractive,
even scary, or slow and obtuse so that he could hurt, rather than
42. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). In holding that prosecutorial comment
would unduly burden the Fifth Amendment right by making its exercise costly, the Court
went on to point out that, in fact, the inference of guilt from silence is not necessarily accu-
rate. Id. at 615. An innocent defendant might not testify for many reasons: fear of impeach-
ment by prior crimes; confusion and embarrassment; and timidity and nervousness that
might make the innocent person appear guilty. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 n.15
(1981).
43. Carter, 380 U.S. at 300 (holding that upon the defendant's request, the trial court
must instruct the jury to draw no adverse inferences from the accused's failure to testify);
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340-41 (1978) (holding that the trial court may give a
cautionary instruction even over the defendant's objection).
44. "When Smith took the stand the defense had prepared hun so that every possible
inconsistency in his statement had been carefully thought through and an answer prepared
for every possible question." Barbara A. Babcock, Quick Verdict Shows Prosecutor Failed
to Woo Jurors, LA Timss, Dec. 12, 1991, at A24. See also Barbara A. Babcock, Smith Case
Prosecutor Failed Key Test, LA TiiMS, Dec. 11, 1991, at A19 (discussing the impact of
carefully timed defense testimony).
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help himself as a witness. Calling the decision whether to testify,
"a delicate balancing," the Solicitor General in his Dunnigan brief
said it was a combination of "factors, such as the credibility of his
testimony, his prior criminal record and susceptibility to impeach-
ment, his capacity to withstand cross-examination effectively, the
strength of the government's case, and the availability of other de-
fense evidence." '45
To make this critical and complex decision, the defendant needs
help. And if he has a competent lawyer, his possible testimony has
been a subject of discussion from very early in the representation.
Those who are well-defended rehearse their testimony; the better
defended they are the more they rehearse. One of my first jobs as a
young lawyer in the office of Edward Bennett Williams was to pre-
pare a defendant to take the stand. We spent all day, every day,
for weeks going over Ins testimony. By the time he took the stand,
he had heard every possible question at least once. But even in
(most) cases where preparation is necessarily less thorough, de-
fense lawyers m their final arguments can urge the unequal
confrontation:
You saw my client, with her sixth grade education, who has
never before spoken to an audience in public, on trial in a fed-
eral court; and you saw the government prosecutor with her de-
cades of learning, and years of experience, closely cross-examine
her. Yet in this unequal contest, you never once heard my client
deviate from her basic testimony in this case: she is not guilty.
Fleshed out, this argument alone can make it worth the defend-
ant's taking the stand, even if his testimony is weak in substance
and halting m style.
Let me summarize the discussion so far of taking the stand from
the defense view. The decision is fraught-but always in the back-
ground is the fact that his failure to testify will increase the al-
ready great probability that he will go to prison. Now to this deli-
cate calculus, add the fact that if the accused has confessed to his
45. Brief for Petitioner at 16, United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (No. 91-
1300). The Solicitor General went on to argue, with seemingly unconscious cynicism, that
the Guidelines actually may aid the defendant's decision about whether to take the stand
because he can calculate the exact cost of perjury, rather than guessing at what the judge
might impose. Id.
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lawyer (perhaps in response to the lawyer's mention of confidenti-
ality), then, according to official doctrine, he may not take the
stand in the normal course. All professional canons and codes
agree that an attorney may not knowingly aid or induce perjured
testimony 46 In fact, a lawyer who threatens to reveal the defend-
ant's lie to the court if he takes the stand, is not ineffective, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court.47 Where does this situation leave
the defense lawyer after Dunnigan, one might well ask?
Remember that Dunnigan holds that the trial court must in-
crease significantly the sentence upon finding that the defendant
committed perjury But what does such a finding say about the
defense lawyer, who, if she was doing her job, at least elicited the
testimony, also presumably shaped and rehearsed it, and who ar-
gued its credibility to the jury in closing 48 Should the trial judge
also refer the defense lawyer for disciplinary action?
Such a preposterous result could follow from Dunnigan, because
it is written without regard either to the pressure on an accused to
testify, or to the responsibilities of defense counsel to advise him.49
I would hate to be in the position of explaining to a client that he
has a right to take the stand, but that if he is convicted, his sen-
46. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.3(a)(4) ("A lawyer shall not know-
ingly offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSmmITY DR 7-102 (A)(4) ("[A] lawyer shall not [k]nowingly use perjured testi-
mony or false evidence."); id. at DR 7-102 (A)(6) ("[A] lawyer shall not participate in
the creation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false."). See
also supra note 35.
47. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (holding that the defense attorney's threat
to withdraw from the case if the defendant committed what the lawyer considered perjury
was not ineffective assistance because it did not "breach any recognized professional
duty").
48. The Supreme Court rejected a Georgia practice of allowing the defendant's testimony
only through an unsworn statement. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). In hold-
Ing that due process required the help of counsel in shaping the testimony of the accused,
the Court observed:
The tensions of a trial for an accused with life or liberty at stake might alone
render him utterly unfit to give his explanation properly and completely. Left
without the "guiding hand of counsel," he may fail properly to introduce, or to
introduce at all, what may be a perfect defense.
Id. at 594-95 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
49. The right to testify and the right to counsel are closely associated in the Court's juris-
prudence. Establishing formally the right to testify, Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987),
relied on Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 582 (holding that a Georgia rule that did not allow counsel
to elicit answers through formal questioning violated due process). See supra note 48.
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tence very probably, practically automatically, will be increased
two levels for perjury. And that this could be done even without
anyone proving that he lied; it is simply a matter of the judge's
opinion from hearing him on the stand. This situation would baffle
most lay people, of whom defendants are only a specially inter-
ested and alert subset.50 Here is how it would sound:
You have a constitutional right to take the stand.
But if you lie on any important fact or, if you get confused or
are mistaken and appear to be lying, the judge will very proba-
bly increase your sentence.
You do not have a right to take the stand on the perjury charge.
If the judge decides to add time to your sentence, you will not
have a right to explain that you were confused or mistaken.
In some, perhaps most, circumstances, the lawyer must also
tell the client:
Since your testimony is that you are innocent, were not even
present at the time, rather than that you were insane, or acted
in self defense or under duress, you are at even greater risk that
the judge will decide that you were lying.51
50. To the perjury explanation, the lawyer probably should add that if the defendant
should continue to deny her guilt after conviction, then she will not receive the two-level
"acceptance of responsibility" reduction in sentence. This scenario happened to Sharon
Dunnigan. See United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 181 (4th Cir, 1992). Of course, if
the accused accepts responsibility and admits her guilt, she will then confirm that her trial
testimony was false, and justify a sentence increase.
51. The Court in Dunnigan argued that enhancement will not occur in every case in
which the defendant testifies. Id. at 184-85. The court may find that he was confused, or
mistaken rather than lying. In addition, certain types of defenses, the Court mentions "lack
of capacity, insanity, duress or self-defense," United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111,
1117 (1993), may be truthful but not sufficient to justify the criminal act, in the jury's deter-
mination. Paradoxically, the defendant actually might win these sorts of cases and some
forms of entrapment without taking the stand because the claim is not one of total non-
involvement. See, e.g., John Riley, Acquittal: The DeLorean Defense Lawyers Discover Si-
lence Can Be Golden, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 3, 1984, at 3, 14 (examining the trial defense strategy
of John DeLorean after his acquittal on cocaine conspiracy charges, and quoting a surprised
criminal defense lawyer, who noted that "[iln a case with videotapes [of the alleged criminal
activity], to win an entrapment defense without putting the defendant on the stand is in-
credible"). The enumerated defenses peculiarly may involve other witnesses through whom
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And for good measure, she should add the following:
The judge must decide whether you were lying on important
facts if the prosecutor asks him to. It would be hard for the
judge to find that you were truthful when you claimed innocence
in the face of a jury verdict, especially because the sentencing
judge himself presided over the trial.
The Court's unanimous decision in Dunnigan will require real
people to hold such absurd dialogue. The opinion, and the case line
from which it springs, undercut the defendant's choice at a critical
moment, destabilizing the equality that we have tried to approxi-
mate between the adversaries at the trial itself.
The opinion's unanimity emphasizes the fact that the Court as
an institution no longer understands the defense perspective. Its
decisions these days are so resolutely pro-prosecution that inter-
pretations and practices once designed to prevent government
overreaching no longer serve that purpose. Some examples in the
following pages are the ban on using race to strike potential ju-
rors,52 certainty in sentencing,53 the Miranda rule,54 the suppres-
sion of evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment,55
and habeas corpus review of constitutional error.56 When the bal-
ance shifts too far, as the commentators gathered here believe it
has, not only defendants' rights in a formal sense, but the funda-
mental fairness of the system itself is at stake.
the defendant's story can be presented. For instance, insanity defenses almost always in-
volve the testimony of experts and lay witnesses to the state of mind. See, e.g., Laura A.
Kiernan & Eric Pianin, Hinckley Found Not Guilty, Insane, WASH. POST, June 22, 1982, at
Al, A12 (noting that although John Hinckley never took the stand in his trial for shooting
President Reagan, Hinckley's lawyers successfully presented his insanity defense to the jury
using the testimony of three expert witnesses). Thus, the Court's only examples of cases in
which perjury might not be held against the defendant are also ones in which it is least
likely that the defendant must take the stand.
52. Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 21 (1993).
53. Sara S. Beale, Procedural Issues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The Constitu-
tional Significance of the "Elements of Sentence," 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147 (1993).
54. Paul Marcus, A Return to the "Bright Line Rule" of Miranda, 35 WsI. & MARY L.
REV. 93 (1993).
55. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197 (1993).
56. John H. Blume & Stephen P Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus
After Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163 (1993).
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To end this introduction on an optimistic rather than apocry-
phal note-m most instances the Court has not overruled the
precedents it has undercut; nor has it prevented or prohibited
lower courts from assuming a more pro-defense stance. In Dunni-
gan, for example, nothing in the opinion prevents a sentencing
judge from holding a due process hearing before he enhances a sen-
tence for trial perjury, or even from requiring that perjury be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. There is still interpretive room,
in other words, for restoring equilibrium to the criminal process by
shoring up the accused.
